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Introduction
Over the past decade a number of 
factors have transformed global 
and national energy markets. 
Access to low-cost natural gas 
has been a significant part of this 
trend. Nationally, natural gas-fired 
power generation was expected to 
have exceeded coal-fired power 
generation for the first time in 
2016,1 and in New England about 
50 percent of electricity is now 
generated from natural gas.2 With 
natural gas now such a large part 
of New England’s energy mix, 
there is a concern that the demand 
for heating and electricity during 
cold periods will cause spikes in 
wholesale electricity prices and 
that demand may be greater than 
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the available pipeline capacity to 
deliver natural gas.3 The region’s 
utility industry has proposed the 
expansion of pipeline capacity to 
meet this seasonal increase in the 
demand for natural gas. 
In light of the trends influencing 
energy markets, this perspectives 
brief and a related report4 examine 
the cost of electrical power in New 
Hampshire and New England, the 
reliability of the electrical power 
system in terms of its ability to 
May 2017 update 
PointLogic Energy, a source for 
natural gas pipeline flow and 
capacity in the original report, 
has recently updated its models 
for calculating natural gas flow 
in the Tennessee Gas Pipeline in 
New England. This model update 
has resulted in significant changes 
to their previous estimates. Most 
importantly, data obtained from 
PointLogic Energy in Decem-
ber 2016 supported the finding 
that overall net gas flow in the 
“Tennessee Gas Pipeline: NY to 
MA” was from Massachusetts 
to New York from 2013–2016; 
their revised models indicate a 
net flow during the same period 
from New York to Massachu-
setts. To be conservative, we 
have removed analysis of natural 
gas pipeline flow and capacity 
from this report that relied on 
the original data obtained from 
PointLogic Energy. Instead, we 
use estimates of natural gas pipe-
line flow and capacity published 
in a 2014 ICF International report 
that was commissioned by ISO 
New England (Exhibit 2-3, pp. 
12)a and information provided 
by the U.S.  Energy Information 
Administration.b
a ICF International, “Assessment of New Eng-
land’s Natural Gas Pipeline Capacity to Satisfy 
Short and Near-Term Electric Generation 
Needs: Phase II,” 2014 (see endnote 14).
b U.S. Energy Information Administration,  
“U.S. State-to-State Capacity,” updated 
12/31/2015; U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration, “New England Natural Gas Pipeline 
Capacity Increases for the First Time Since 
2010,” December 6, 2016 (see endnote 15).
meet demand, and the risk New 
Hampshire ratepayers might face 
from various proposals to secure 
or increase the supply of electricity. 
We find evidence that near-term 
levels of demand and supply pose 
no threat to grid reliability, that 
current pipeline capacity is ade-
quate, and that better contracting 
practices and other “soft-infrastruc-
ture” changes combined with the 
promotion of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy will have at least 
as large a return on investment as 
expanded pipeline capacity, without 
exposing ratepayers to higher elec-
tricity rates stemming from expen-
sive infrastructure investments. 
Cost of Electrical Power  
in New Hampshire 
In 2015, electricity accounted for 
approximately 25 percent ($1.7 
billion) of all energy expenditures 
in New Hampshire,5 and aver-
age retail electricity prices in the 
state, at 18.5 cents per kilowatt 
hour, were the eighth highest in 
the country and 47 percent higher 
than the U.S. average (Table 1). 
The latter is also the case for New 
England as a whole. But despite 
these higher rates, the average 
monthly New Hampshire residen-
tial electricity bill was $115, similar 
to the U.S. monthly average of 
$114.6 New Hampshire residents 
pay 5.5 percent of their income for 
overall household energy-related 
expenses, similar to the overall U.S. 
resident portion of expenditures 
at 5.6 percent. In terms of com-
mercial use, the average monthly 
New Hampshire electric utility bill 
in 2015 was actually lower than the 
U.S. average commercial bill,  
at $529 versus $671.7 
FIGURE 1. NEW ENGLAND ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND REAL STATE GDP FOR 
NEW ENGLAND, 2000–2015
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis 
TABLE 1. AVERAGE PRICE OF ELEC-
TRICITY AND AVERAGE MONTHLY 
ELECTRIC BILL IN NH AND THE U.S. 





Price of Electricity  
(cents per KWH) 18.5¢ 12.7¢
 
Electric Bill  
(dollars per month) $115 $114
Commercial  
 
Price of Electricity  
(cents per KWH) 15.0¢ 10.6¢
 
Electric Bill  
(dollars per month) $529 $671
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
The relatively higher price of 
electricity in New Hampshire and 
New England is a result of several 
factors,8 including higher transmis-
sion and distribution costs that 
have resulted from a large number 
of new transmission projects (over 
600 across New England since 
20029), wholesale market rules, 
higher air quality standards, his-
torical investment decisions (and 
the stranded costs associated with 
some of those investments), and 
the lack of indigenous fossil fuel 
sources that place the region at the 
“end of the pipeline” for the trans-
port of fossil fuels. 
New England has adapted to 
higher prices through energy 
efficiency and other energy man-
agement investments.10 Even as the 
combined gross domestic product 
(GDP) for all six New England 
states increased by 9.7 percent 
from 2005 to 2015, overall energy 
use declined by 9.6 percent (Figure 
1). During the same period, the 
U.S. GDP grew 15.2 percent while 
energy consumption fell 3.4 percent 
(Figure 2). Energy intensity (energy 
use divided by GDP) in New 
England is much lower than the 
U.S. average (Figure 3), demonstrat-
ing that New England consumes 
much less energy per dollar of GDP. 
In addition, over the past decade, 
New England’s energy intensity has 
improved by 12.7 percent. 
Though New Hampshire resi-
dents and businesses pay the same 
or less for energy as other areas of 
the country, it is important to pre-
vent further increases in the cost 
of energy and ideally to reduce the 
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overall cost of electricity in New 
Hampshire. This is especially true 
for customer groups adversely 
affected by New Hampshire’s 
relatively high electricity prices, 
including more intensive com-
mercial and industrial users of 
electricity, as well as low-income 
households who pay a greater por-
tion of their income for energy.
Reliability of the 
Electrical Supply
In New England, the share of electri-
cal power generated from natural gas 
has grown from 15 percent in 2000 
to almost 50 percent in 2015.11 The 
region’s electric utility industry has 
expressed concern that the demand 
for electricity during periods of cold 
winter weather will be greater than 
current pipeline capacity to deliver 
natural gas, resulting in unreason-
ably high electricity prices and pos-
sible power grid instability. ISO New 
England, the organization respon-
sible for coordinating the region’s 
power grid, has called for new natu-
ral gas infrastructure investment.12 
Several studies conducted between 
2012 and 2015 have examined 
the reliability of the New England 
power grid, and none of the eight 
reviewed for this study found that 
grid reliability is an immediate risk 
to New England’s energy security.13 
Furthermore, while some studies 
have suggested that grid reliabil-
ity may be an issue after 2021, the 
potential challenges are primarily 
associated with extreme operating 
conditions. The region’s power grid 
system operator has demonstrated 
success in managing these extreme 
conditions and has been proactive 
in adapting the rules and procedures 
under which power generators oper-
ate to further increase grid reliability.
Several lines of evidence support 
the conclusion that few if any elec-
trical grid reliability problems are 
likely to emerge before 2021. First, 
an ICF International report14 esti-
mates natural gas pipeline capacity 
in New England at 4.17 billion cubic 
feet per day (Bcf/d) (Table 2). This, 
combined with peak shaving capac-
ity (1.45 Bcf/d) and direct LNG 
import capacity (0.72 Bcf/d), esti-
mates an overall supply capacity of 
natural gas of 6.34 Bcf/d in winter. 
This capacity value exceeds recent 
New England peak winter demand 
(compare Table 2 values to the peak 
demand of under 5 Bcf/d illustrated 
in Figure 4). A separate indica-
tor of pipeline capacity is the sum 
of state inflow capacities obtained 
FIGURE 2. U.S ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND REAL U.S. GDP, 2000–2015
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis 
FIGURE 3. ENERGY INTENSITY FOR THE NEW ENGLAND STATES AND THE 
ENTIRE UNITED STATES FROM 2000–2015
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis
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from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (U.S. EIA) for natu-
ral gas pipelines in New England 
of 4.96 Bcf/d.15 This represents 
an estimate of the total pipeline 
capacity that exists in New England. 
However, some pipeline in-flow 
capacity may not be fully available 
due to technical capacity constraints 
within the New England natural gas 
system.16 The difference between the 
state in-flow pipeline capacity and 
the estimates of pipeline capacity 
obtained from the ICF study17 raises 
the possibility that pipeline capacity 
may be underutilized and/or that 
changes in New England internal 
gas pipeline infrastructure might 
allow for greater utilization of exist-
ing in-flow pipeline infrastructure.
Second, “soft infrastructure” 
changes (changes to rules, regu-
lations, or policies such as the 
Winter Reliability Program) can 
serve as an effective tool for miti-
gating spikes in wholesale prices. 
For example, New England elec-
tric utilities that purchase gas to 
generate electricity typically do not 
contract for firm transportation 
FIGURE 4. DAILY NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION BY SECTOR IN NEW ENGLAND 
FROM 2007–2016 IN BILLION CUBIC FEET PER DAY
Note: Wintertime consumption by the residential/commercial (blue line) and industrial (black line) sectors peaks in 
winter, while consumption by gas-fired power generators (red line) peaks in summer. Source: PointLogic Energy. 
Available online at https://pointlogicenergy.com/.
services18 to obtain natural gas; 
instead, they take what is left 
over. This is a major deliverability 
challenge and diminishes sup-
ply reliability. Specifically, power 
generators that rely on natural gas 
to generate electricity do not find it 
profitable to contract for access to 
gas under the current New England 
power system rules because firm 
gas transportation arrangements 
are structured as “take-or-pay” 
contracts.19 Under these contracts, 
generators are required to pay for 
transportation capacity whether 
or not they are operating, and 
therefore contracts are not desir-
able. During most days of the year, 
generators are able to access gas 
and use transportation that would 
otherwise be surplus at far lower 
cost than contracting for firm 
transportation. While this con-
tracting structure works for most 
of the year, during days of high 
demand it can result in periods 
when most of the gas is being used 
by sources who have gas contracts 
(including natural gas utilities sup-
plying their residential customers 
and large industrial users). While 
such scarcity can result in price 
spikes for natural gas and electric-
ity when demand increases rapidly 
due to very cold periods or when 
other major electricity generation 
stations (such as nuclear power 
plants) go off-line, they do not 
appear to impact system reli-
ability. For example, during the 
high demand for natural gas and 
related price spikes that occurred 
in January 2014 associated with 
the outbreak of the Polar Vortex, 
not only did the ISO New England 
power grid provide sufficient elec-
tricity to New England consumers 
during this time period, ISO New 
England actually assisted the PJM 
(Mid-Atlantic) energy marketplace 
by dispatching additional genera-
tion units in New England.20
Third, electricity consumption in 
New England is expected to decline 
by 0.2 percent per year over the 
next decade.21 Even with this pro-
jected decline, concerns have been 
raised about the supply impact of 
the 2014 retirement of the Vermont 













TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF NEW 
ENGLAND NATURAL GAS SUPPLY 
CAPABILITIES
Note: * LNG only includes Everett; it does not include 
LNG from Northeast Gateway or Neptune. Source: ICF 
International. Available online at https://www.iso-ne.
com/static-assets/documents/2014/11/final_icf_phii_
gas_study_report_with_appendices_112014.pdf.
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the proposed retirement of Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power in Massachusetts 
in 2019, as well as the possible 
closure of several coal- and oil-
fired generating plants.22 Requests 
from companies to connect electric 
generation assets to the grid (inter-
connection requests) are, however, 
plentiful. Between 2016 and 2020, 
more than 11,000 megawatts of 
capacity (35 percent of total exist-
ing generating capacity of 31,000 
megawatts23) have been proposed, 
and these don’t even include plans 
for transmission lines to import 
hydroelectric energy from Canada, 
discussed below. Almost 60 per-
cent of proposed generation is 
natural gas or dual fuel (natural 
gas and oil) and about 35 percent 
is wind, mostly in Maine. While 
not all projects will necessarily be 
constructed, the interconnection 
requests provide a useful indicator 
that there is a considerable amount 
of new electrical power production 
slated to come online in the near 
future. One report suggests that, 
from a reliability perspective, the 
current buildout plan—evidenced 
by the interconnection requests—is 
sufficient over the short term.24 
Plans to build new transmis-
sion lines to import hydropower 
from Quebec into New England 
include the Northern Pass25 project, 
designed to bring 1,090 megawatts 
through New Hampshire, and 
the 1,000 megawatt New England 
Clean Power Link26 transmission 
line underneath Lake Champlain 
and into Vermont. This range of 
new supply could provide diver-
sity in the source of energy used 
to power New England’s grid, 
an important hedge in light of 
rapidly changing global energy 
markets. There has been insuf-
ficient study assessing the energy 
security risk of increasing New 
England’s dependence on natural 
gas sourced primarily from one 
geographic region (Marcellus Shale 
from the Appalachian Basin). Yet, 
the natural gas export capacity 
from that region to other regions 
of the United States and globally is 
expanding significantly.27
Risks to the Grid and to 
Ratepayers
The difference between the sum 
of state in-flow capacity obtained 
from the U.S. EIA and the esti-
mated available capacity assumed 
in the ICF study may be evidence 
of some of the potential risks 
associated with pipeline invest-
ments including that changes in 
supply and/or demand can result 
in underutilized pipeline. Demand 
can end up not matching sup-
ply when the pipelines are built, 
leaving stranded costs that the 
customer ends up having to pay. 
(Stranded costs are ones that must 
be paid by utility ratepayers if 
infrastructure investments become 
redundant either through market 
forces or regulation.) Given the 
long-term cost recovery period of 
infrastructure, a poorly informed 
decision can have a long-term 
impact on electricity rates.
Previous utility proposals have 
requested that New Hampshire 
electric ratepayers fund the costs 
associated with new natural gas 
pipelines. But the finding that near-
term energy supply is not a threat 
to power grid stability28 provides 
New Hampshire policy makers 
time (that is, years) to fully con-
sider the costs, benefits, and risks 
associated with increasing New 
Hampshire’s reliance on one fuel 
source from one geographic region. 
Proceeding carefully and 
deliberately seems particularly 
important if the taxpayer (and 
not private capital) will be 
funding the new infrastructure. 
Proceeding carefully and deliber-
ately seems particularly important 
if the taxpayer (and not private 
capital) will be funding the new 
infrastructure. An example sup-
porting a careful approach is the 
investment in 2012 of $409 million 
in new pollution control equip-
ment at the Merrimack Station 
coal-fired power generation plant 
in Bow, New Hampshire. Due to 
changing market conditions, the 
plant is now valued at just $10 mil-
lion. New Hampshire ratepayers 
are paying for all but $25 million 
of the $409 million through a cost 
recovery mechanism on electricity 
bills.29 This single investment30 will 
add 0.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (or 
about 2.5 to 3.0 percent) to every 
New Hampshire electric ratepayer’s 
bill for many years to come. If new 
natural gas capacity results in over-
build, and ratepayers are contractu-
ally obligated for the costs, the cost 
of unneeded capacity will reduce 
the savings estimated to accrue to 
electric ratepayers.
Responses from an October 2016 
Granite State Poll31 show that a large 
swath of New Hampshire resi-
dents—58 percent—oppose using 
ratepayer funds for new pipeline 
infrastructure. This view was shared 
by almost half of self-described politi-
cally conservative respondents (48 
percent) and six in ten liberals (63 
percent) and moderates (60 percent). 
Historically, New Hampshire has 
lagged behind the New England 
region in renewable energy and 
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energy efficiency investment. For 
example, in 2015 New Hampshire 
had both the lowest total ($26 mil-
lion) and per capita ($19.20) public 
spending on electric efficiency pro-
grams out of the New England states. 
New Hampshire’s per capita expen-
diture on energy efficiency programs 
was almost 80 percent less than 
that of Vermont.32 However, New 
Hampshire has made progress in 
supporting clean energy investment 
with its participation in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (enacted 
in 2008), the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (2007), and the recently 
approved Energy Efficiency Resource 
Standard (EERS) (August 2016). The 
New Hampshire EERS takes effect 
in January 2018 and has established 
a cumulative goal of 3.1 percent 
electric savings relative to 2014 
kilowatt-hour sales. States that have 
implemented EERS have experi-
enced three times the energy savings 
as states without an EERS.33 This is 
an example of the type of policy that 
is expected to help New Hampshire 
cost effectively meet its energy needs 
without paying for large infrastruc-
ture projects and dealing with the 
associated stranded-costs risk. 
The relative net benefits of pipe-
line expansion, LNG contracting, 
and energy efficiency and demand 
reduction for New England were 
analyzed in a 2015 Analysis Group 
report34 that followed a transparent 
methodology and made assump-
tions based on the current state of 
the energy marketplace. Results 
showed all three scenarios hav-
ing a significant positive return on 
investment for ratepayers (these 
returns do not include environ-
mental benefits). The LNG contract 
scenario had the lowest annual 
cost ($18 million) and the highest 
anticipated return on investment 
(150 percent). The energy efficiency 
scenario had the highest annual 
cost ($101 million) but a return on 
investment (145 percent) similar 
to LNG. Pipeline expansion had 
an annual cost in between these 
two scenarios ($66 million), and a 
lower but still significant return on 
investment (92 percent). In terms 
of dollars, the energy efficiency 
scenario has the highest return on 
investment of $146 million versus 
$61 million for pipeline expansion 
and $27 million for LNG.
A measure of stranded-cost poten-
tial was developed by calculating the 
worst-case scenario for dollars at risk 
(a measure that indicates the magni-
tude of risk, not the likelihood). The 
LNG and energy efficiency scenarios 
have similar worst-case stranded-cost 
risk profiles, ranging between $90 
million and $101 million. In contrast, 
the risk for the pipeline was about 
twenty times higher, at $1,980 million. 
In response to a request from 
New Hampshire energy stakehold-
ers for more New Hampshire-
specific information, we developed 
a spreadsheet model to directly 
compare the net benefits of pipe-
line expansion versus expansion of 
energy efficiency and solar energy. 
The assumptions used to develop 
the model are detailed in Section 
5 of the full report. The total 
estimated cost for the natural gas 
expansion scenario from 2017 to 
2030 was $1.3 billion, and whole-
sale electricity cost savings (based 
on optimistic industry estimates) 
totaled $1.6 billion (Figure 5; note 
the figure shows annual saving). 
This produces a simple return 
on investment over the period of 
$1.30 for every dollar spent. The 
total estimated cost of the energy 
efficiency and solar energy scenario 
from 2017 to 2030 was $1.1 billion 
and the savings were $2.3 billion 
(without discounting for future 
value). This produces a simple 
return on investment of $2 for 
every dollar spent.
New Hampshire residents favor 
investment in renewable energy. 
New Hampshire residents favor 
investment in renewable energy. 
In response to a Granite State Poll 
question35 on priorities for energy 
sources in the future, by almost a 
3-to-1 margin respondents gave 
higher priority to renewable energy 
sources (67 percent) compared 
to natural gas (24 percent). Large 
majorities of self-reported political 
liberals (88 percent) and moderates 
(70 percent) preferred increased 
use of renewable energy sources, 
while self-described conservatives 
were as likely to prioritize natu-
ral gas (46 percent) as renewable 
energy (45 percent). 
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that there 
is no immediate need for New 
Hampshire to expand natural gas 
pipeline infrastructure. If the state 
wishes to intervene in the market 
by obligating ratepayer funds to 
reduce wholesale electricity costs, 
additional public investment in 
major pipeline infrastructure 
should wait until a rigorous study 
has been completed that models 
system wide natural gas flows and 
prices. This study should lead to 
an improved understanding of 
the difference between the tech-
nical and economic capacity of 
the existing system and explore 
opportunities to access more of 
the technical pipeline capacity 
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in cost-effective ways. To date, 
no study of which we are aware 
has performed the level of rigor-
ous analysis required to justify 
a major multidecadal contract 
obligating ratepayers, and mov-
ing ahead without such a study 
would essentially make ratepayers 
energy market speculators. Policy 
makers also may want to consider 
other options that carry less risk 
and a better return on invest-
ment, including better utilization 
of existing infrastructure and 
increased investment in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy.
Contracts for natural gas capac-
ity that are funded by ratepayers 
should be conducted through 
a request-for-proposals (RFP) 
process, as recommended by the 
Public Utility Commission.36 
This process should examine all 
avenues of gas supply, including 
new pipelines, existing pipelines, 
and LNG capacity. The underly-
ing costs and assumptions from 
vendor submissions should also 
be placed in the public domain 
for review. Since there is evidence 
that costs may be lower from more 
effective use of existing infrastruc-
ture, an RFP process would allow 
the least-cost option to be revealed 
through a fair, open, and competi-
tive bidding process.37
Based on the detailed analy-
sis provided in Sections 3 and 4 
of the full report, and given the 
projected low peak-load growth 
and uncertainty in future energy 
markets, it is advisable to avoid 
expensive market interventions or, 
at minimum, to prioritize invest-
ments that have the highest return 
on investment, lowest projected 
cost, and lowest risk. This practice 
will serve to keep rates affordable 
by reducing spending on expen-
sive utility infrastructure that has 
been demonstrated in the past 
to increase rates (for example, 
Merrimack Station). 
The findings of this study 
suggest that the LNG contract 
scenario or renewable energy and 
energy efficiency investment (up 
to the maximal economic poten-
tial estimated by the Vermont 
Energy Investment Corporation 
to be approximately 6 percent 
of the total New Hampshire 
energy load38) will be the most 
cost-effective alternatives while 
also representing low financial 
risk to New Hampshire rate-
payers. Furthermore, policies 
should consider the unintended 
or disproportionate impacts on 
the populations most negatively 
affected by increased energy 
prices, including large commercial 
and industrial users and low-
income households. In conclusion, 
we argue that the while the utility 
companies’ stated goal of reduc-
ing electricity costs in the State is 
admirable, that ironically, their 
strategy of expanded natural gas 
capacity in the region funded by 
ratepayers poses a significant risk 
of raising electricity costs further.
Data
Energy data used in this brief are 
from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, ICF International, 
Inc. and PointLogic Energy, and 
Gross Domestic Product and Price 
Index data from U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. We also conducted a 
review of prior/existing studies 
that focused on natural gas infra-
structure, and energy efficiency 
and renewable energy implemen-
tation. Citations provided in the 
endnotes and detailed in the full 
report, http://scholars.unh.edu/
sustainability/6/.
FIGURE 5. RESULTS FROM A SPREADSHEET MODEL COMPARING ANNUAL SAV-
INGS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE BASED ON INVESTING IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE(S) 
VERSUS INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND SOLAR ENERGY
Note: Total projected cumulative savings from 2017 to 2030 are $1.63 billion for the natural gas pipeline scenario 
and $2.27 billion for the clean energy scenario. Source: Wake et al., “New Hampshire’s Electricity Markets: Natu-
ral Gas, Renewable Energy, and Energy Efficiency,” 2017, Section 5, http://scholars.unh.edu/sustainability/6/.
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